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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR KNIGHT,  
ARE EMPIRICISTS ASKING THE RIGHT 
QUESTIONS ABOUT JUDICIAL 
DECISIONMAKING? 
H. JEFFERSON POWELL† 
Although I was honored by the invitation to comment on Jack 
Knight’s article, I was also a little puzzled. I do not do the sort of 
work to which this Symposium is devoted, nor do I even read very 
much of it. When I do dip into empirical studies of the courts, I often 
find them rather difficult or even alien, both in style and in focus. I 
also find them frustrating: the empiricists frequently appear to be 
battling a formalist straw man who believes that law can be done by 
following rules that do not allow for discretion in their interpretation 
or application. I do not know anyone who thinks that. Perhaps, I 
speculated, my role is meant to be like that of a Martian, invited to 
give the perspective from another planet. 
Once I read Professor Knight’s wonderful article, however, I had 
a very different sense. Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions 
About Judicial Decisionmaking?1 is not only written in clear and 
graceful English. Even more important, it is to me a reason for great 
hope that the astronomical distance between empirical work and the 
concerns of normative legal analysts—like me—is diminishing 
rapidly. I believe that empirical work along the lines that Professor 
Knight proposes will prove to be of great interest not only to other 
empiricists but also to judges, practicing lawyers, and scholars who 
write normatively about the courts. 
Part of the reason for my hope is that Professor Knight’s article 
is free of the assumption (sometimes evident in empirical studies of 
the law) that the normative concerns of others make them blind to 
the role of politics and policy in judicial decisionmaking. Normative 
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analysts have long known that judicial decisionmaking often involves, 
and cannot exclude the influence of, considerations that go beyond 
the proverbial black-letter law. Take the famous essay by Judge 
Joseph Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision.2 Hutcheson was no foe of doctrinal 
analysis, but he argued vigorously that in practice the role of doctrine 
is not to exclude the personal convictions and inclinations of judges, 
but to provide them with the means of testing their intuitions about 
the best judgment against the concerns and results reached by other 
judges in other cases.3 Hutcheson published the essay in 1929, but it 
sounds eerily like Judge Posner’s description of judicial 
decisionmaking,4 although Hutcheson could have benefitted from 
Professor Knight’s more nuanced understanding.5 To be sure, 
Hutcheson is often counted as a sort of legal realist, but his writing 
generally indicates that he was a perfectly orthodox lawyer of the 
generation that entered the profession about 1900. But if Hutcheson 
is not persausive, consider a bigger and much older figure. This is 
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing in 1807: “The judgment is so 
essentially influenced by the wishes, the affections, and the general 
theories of those by whom any political proposition is decided, that a 
contrariety of opinion on . . . great constitutional question[s] might 
well have been expected.”6 So it is not news that one cannot describe 
judicial choices in drily formalistic terms, and Professor Knight does 
not think otherwise.7 
Of course, if opinions are no longer thought to explain decisions 
the way a proof explains a proposition in Euclidean geometry, one 
 
 2. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in 
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). 
 3. Id. at 285–88. 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 84–85 (2008). 
 5. See Knight, supra note 1, at 1539–54 (interpreting Judge Posner’s work to derive three 
sets of factors in judicial decisionmaking that serve as a background for assessing the success of 
empiricism). 
 6. 5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 297 (1807). 
 7. On a related point, Professor Knight understands that neither statistics nor game 
theory is necessary to understand that outcomes on collegial courts reflect the exigencies of 
multimember decisionmaking bodies. To cite Chief Justice Marshall once more, Professor G. 
Edward White’s groundbreaking examination of the internal workings of Marshall’s Court 
illustrates these points and Marshall’s acute awareness of them. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 1 (1988) (providing “a detailed 
description of the Court’s internal deliberations, the first effort to survey the Court’s 
nonconstitutional cases between 1815 and 1835, and the first detailed investigation of the 
intellectual legal culture in which the Court’s decisions were grounded”). 
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might wonder why anyone bothers doing doctrinal work (other than 
as a species of advocacy) or, for that matter, why the practice of 
writing opinions even persists. Yet judges do continue to write 
opinions, and scholars (well, academic lawyers at any rate) continue 
to study what those opinions say. Professor Knight’s article is so 
excitingly full of promise because it grapples with this reality. He, as I 
read him, is proposing in part that social scientists turn their 
formidable tools on opinion writing not to exorcise once more the 
formalist bogeyman but to deepen our understanding of what 
opinions do and how they do it . . . and, ultimately, how we evaluate 
judges.8 
Professor Knight is calling for an expansion of social science 
work in the first instance by moving beyond what has been a heavy 
emphasis on outcomes.9 The form and content of the judicial opinion 
demand explicit analysis not for formalistic reasons but precisely 
because from a social scientist’s perspective the work must be done if 
the scientist is to investigate the role of opinion writing as a 
justificatory practice, or the antecedent question of which factors 
actually affect decisions. Opinions are not epiphenomenal froth on a 
sea of political choices, but an essential part of the overall decisional 
process that deserves attention. Knight’s exciting suggestion is that 
social scientists can advance this understanding of decisionmaking by 
developing “richer and more complex kinds of empirical 
evidence . . . . sufficient to adequately characterize substantive 
content, and yet satisfy the requirements of explanation in the social 
sciences.”10 Lawyers whose orientation is doctrinal, conceptual, or 
historical can give us a “richly detailed”11 account of the substance of 
law, but social science rests in part on what Knight calls “the desire 
for generalization,”12 “the identification of causal mechanisms that 
apply generally to specific social situations,”13 or, in the context of this 
Symposium, “the general causal framework in which judges change 
 
 8. See Knight, supra note 1, at 1553 (“[T]he normative assessment of judicial quality is 
best served by an analysis of matters of judicial reasoning and justificatory practice and not by 
studies of judicial motivation.”). 
 9. Id. (encouraging “empirical social scientists [to] take up . . . a broader research focus on 
substantive content”). 
 10. Id. at 1554. 
 11. Id. at 1555. 
 12. Id. at 1554. 
 13. Id. 
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and justify the law.”14 It is in their disciplined attention to this sort of 
explanation that Knight believes social scientists have a comparative 
advantage.15 I think that he is right, and that research of the sort he 
proposes will be of great interest to those of us focused on normative 
issues—whether as judges, lawyers or scholars. 
I do not have time to discuss Professor Knight’s fascinating 
suggestions about how to execute this research agenda.16 I have two 
quick thoughts. First, I suspect that he and others working in this vein 
may well find themselves in conversation with figures from the legal 
past such as Karl Llewellyn and, before Llewellyn, John Chipman 
Gray. Llewellyn lacked Professor Knight’s far more sophisticated 
understanding of the problems of measurement, but his great book, 
The Common Law Tradition,17 could be seen as a first and necessarily 
primitive effort to develop the tools for evaluating opinions that 
Knight is seeking. Llewellyn’s discussion of judicial styles has more in 
common with Knight’s concerns than with literary-critical approaches 
to law, and his resort to reading chronologically determined slices of 
particular courts’ decisions was a recognizable effort at sampling. 
Although Gray did not use the tools of a modern social scientist, his 
study of The Nature and Sources of the Law18 is still worth reading as a 
learned reflection on how to characterize the substantive content of 
opinions and the decisions they justify in a thoroughly empirical spirit 
of inquiry. 
Second, I believe that executive branch legal decisionmaking is 
an area that cries out for study along Professor Knight’s lines. The 
problem there, to be sure, is not that people are tempted to think of 
decisionmaking in overly formalistic ways (as with the courts) but that 
many assume that there is nothing at play but politics in the crudest 
sense. I am quite sure that assumption is overly simple, but at this 
point there is simply no framework for describing executive practice. 
The sort of investigation into judicial opinions that Knight proposes 
 
 14. Id. at 1555. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. at 1554, 1555 (“Any adequate analysis of the crafting of judicial opinions would 
require at least two kinds of measurement: (1) a measure of the substantive content of the law 
and (2) measures of the sources of justification and, thus, of new law . . . . [as measured by 
factors like] precedents, constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative regulations, legislative 
history, generally accepted social practices (e.g., in the commercial law area), social norms and 
basic values on which there is a social consensus in the community.”). 
 17. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). 
 18. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909). 
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would be invaluable in understanding an area that—as the 
controversies over the Justice Department’s role in the War on 
Terrorism have shown—is of great practical significance. 
I am more confident than I was before reading this article that 
the future of social science research into the activity of judging bears 
exciting promise, not only for those engaged in it, but for others as 
well. For that hope, and for an extraordinarily clear introduction to 
the issues, we are greatly indebted to Professor Knight. 
